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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Eric Harold Ewell appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
The facts of the underlying criminal case were set forth by the Idaho Court 
of Appeals in Ewell's prior appeal as follows: 
Police found numerous sexually-explicit pictures of minors 
on a computer to which Ewell had access. One of the pictures was 
used by Ewell in a profile for an internet chat room. Ewell was 
arrested and charged with six counts of possession of sexually 
exploitive material, I.C. § 18-1507A, with a sentence enhancement 
for being a repeat sexual offender, I.C. § 19-2520G. The sentence 
enhancement statute mandates a fifteen-year minimum term of 
confinement for a crime requiring registration as a sex offender 
under I.C. § 18-8304 if the individual was previously convicted of 
such an offense in Idaho or of a substantially equivalent offense in 
another state. The information alleged that Ewell had been 
convicted of luring with a sexual motivation in the state of 
Washington. WASH.REV.CODE§ 9A.40.090. Ewell filed a motion 
to dismiss the enhancement for being a repeat sexual offender 
because the previous Washington offense of luring with a sexual 
motivation, used to justify the enhancement, had no substantially 
equivalent Idaho counterpart that was included in the listed 
offenses of I.C. § 18-8304 requiring sex offender registration in 
Idaho. 
After Ewell filed the motion to dismiss the sentence 
enhancement, the state amended the information to include other 
previous sexual offenses committed in Washington. These 
offenses included luring, luring with a sexual motivation, and 
communicating with a minor for immoral purposes. Ewell then filed 
another motion to dismiss the enhancement for being a repeat 
sexual offender, arguing that I. C. § 19-2520G was 
unconstitutionally vague and inapplicable to the charge against 
him. The district court denied both of Ewell's motions, holding that 
I.C. § 19-2520G applied to Ewell because luring with a sexual 
motivation was substantially similar to the Idaho offenses of second 
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degree kidnapping of an unrelated minor child and first degree 
kidnapping, both of which require sex offender registration in Idaho. 
Furthermore, the district court held that the statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague. 
Ewell entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of 
possession of sexually exploitative material and admitted the 
enhancement for being a repeat sexual offender, specifically that 
he had previously been convicted in Washington of luring, luring 
with a sexual motivation, and communication with a minor for 
immoral purposes. The state dismissed the remaining counts of 
possession of sexually exploitative material. The district court 
sentenced Ewell to a unified term of twenty-five years, with a 
minimum period of confinement of fifteen years. Ewell appeal[ed], 
challenging the district court's denial of his two motions to dismiss 
the enhancement for being a repeat sexual offender. 
State v. Ewell, 147 Idaho 31, 33, 205 P.3d 680, 682 (Ct. App. 2009) (review 
denied April 16, 2009). 
Ewell argued on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion 
to dismiss the sentence enhancement for being a repeat sexual offender, 
contending as he had below that his prior Washington conviction for luring with a 
sexual motivation was not substantially similar to any Idaho offense requiring sex 
offender registration. kl at 33-34, 205 P.3d at 682-83. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals declined to reach the merits of Ewell's claim, noting that, after Ewell filed 
his motion to dismiss, the state amended the information to include two 
additional prior Washington convictions to justify the enhancement. kl at 34, 
205 P.3d at 683. Because Ewell never challenged the use of the two additional 
prior convictions as a basis for the enhancement alleged in the amended 
information, the Court of Appeals Court held: "[A]ny deficiency in the original 
information is irrelevant. Therefore, Ewell has not shown that the district court 
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the enhancement for being a repeat 
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sexual offender even if we assume that luring with a sexual motivation has no 
substantially equivalent Idaho counterpart." JJt The Court of Appeals also 
rejected Ewell's claims that enhancement statute did not apply to him and/or was 
unconstitutionally vague. JJt at 34-37, 205 P.3d at 683-86. 
After the Court of Appeals affirmed Ewell's conviction for possession of 
sexually exploitive material, with a sentence enhancement for being a repeat 
sexual offender, the state moved to correct Ewell's sentence. (R., p.113.) The 
district court granted the motion and "re-sentenced Ewell to an aggregate term of 
fifteen (15) year(s), to be served as flows: a minimum period of confinement of 
fifteen (15) year(s), followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of custody 
not to exceed zero (0) year(s)." (R., p.113 (emphasis original).) 
Statement of Facts and Course of Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Ewell filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and, in it, 
alleged the following grounds for relief: 
(a) Violation of Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amend. Rights. 
(b) Guilty plea was neither knowingly nor intelligently given. 
(c) Psychosexual evaluation Marandaized [sic] PSI was not 
reviewed, nor rights given. Counsel admitted short-comings. 
(R., p.4 (capitalization altered).) He also filed a 67-page "Affidavit In Support Of 
Post Conviction Relief' (R., pp.13-79), to which he referred in his petition (R., 
p.5). 
At Ewell's request, the district court appointed counsel to represent Ewell 
in the post-conviction proceeding. (R., pp.90-93, 95.) After conducting two 
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status conferences, the district court entered an order conditionally dismissing 
Ewell's petition. (R., pp.104-20.) In its order, the court summarized the nature of 
Ewell's claims as follows: 
On February 24, 2010, the Petitioner, Eric Harold Ewell, filed 
a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging ineffective [assistance 
of] counsel ... based on his allegation that his attorney failed to tell 
him that statements made during his psychological evaluation and 
pre-sentence report could be used against him and that he had a 
constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further contends that 
his attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him and 
that his counsel was ineffective by failing to have him examined by 
an independent psychiatrist. Ewell also claimed the use of his past 
crimes to enhance his sentence violated the Double Jeopardy 
clause, his guilty plea was "given under false information" because 
the sentence he received was not the one represented to him, he 
did not have an opportunity to read his pre-sentence report and 
that he was under stress when he completed the psychosexual 
evaluation. He also asks that Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 
P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2007), should be overruled. 
(R., p.104 (footnote omitted).) The court noted, generally, that Ewell did not 
support any of his allegations "with any other affidavits or evidence" and that "his 
factual allegations are not supported by the record." (R., p.104.) The court then 
addressed each claim individually, pointing out specific deficiencies and finding, 
with respect to each claim, that Ewell failed to present a genuine issue of 
material fact that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.115-19.) 
The court gave Ewell 20 days in which to respond to the proposed dismissal. 
(R., pp.105, 119.) Ewell failed to respond and the district court entered an order 
dismissing Ewell's petition for the same reasons articulated in its order of 
conditional dismissal. (R., pp.121-37.) Ewell timely appealed. (R., pp.138-40.) 
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ISSUE 
Ewell states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by dismissing one of Mr. Ewell's claims 
because it misperceived the nature of that claim? 
{Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Ewell failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his post-conviction 
petition? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Ewell Has Failed To Establish Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Post-
Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Ewell challenges the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, arguing that 
the district court misperceived, and therefore failed to address, one of his claims. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) Specifically, Ewell argues that the district court failed 
to address an allegation, set forth at page 62 of his 67-page affidavit in support 
of his post-conviction petition, that he 
was denied effective assistance again when his attorney failed to 
preserve the primary issue for appeal. Attorney Van Bishop 
"admitted his own incompetence" in a letter dated May 13, 2009, 
where he stated "I was ineffective in that I did not preserve the 
primary issue for appeal when I did not renew the motion to dismiss 
after the state amended the information (concerning the Prior Misd. 
Charge)[.] It is referred to in the States [sic] brief and the Courts 
[sic] decision." 
(R., p.74.) According to Ewell's appellate attorney, this was a claim by Ewell that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not renewing his motion to dismiss to argue that 
the prior Washington convictions alleged in the amended information could not 
be used to justify the repeat sexual offender enhancement because none of the 
Washington offenses were substantially similar to any Idaho offense requiring 
sex offender registration. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) The district court 
apparently did not perceive it as such, as it did not specifically address this 
"claim" in either its order of conditional dismissal or its order finally dismissing 
Ewell's petition. (See generally, R., pp.104-37.) Ewell now argues that the 
district court erred and the case must be remanded for consideration of this 
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"claim" by the district court. 1 (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.) Ewell's argument is 
without merit for several reasons. 
First, Ewell's petition does not include a claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to renew his motion to dismiss to argue against the use of 
his prior convictions for enhancement purposes, nor was the district court 
required to scour the affidavit in support of Ewell's petition to divine the "claim" 
Ewell now contends should have been addressed. Because Ewell did not allege 
the "claim" in his petition, he cannot complain for the first time on appeal that the 
district court failed to address it. 
Second, even though the trial court did not specifically address the factual 
allegations in Ewell's affidavit that counsel failed to preserve for appeal the issue 
of whether his prior convictions were valid for enhancement purposes, Ewell has 
failed to show any basis for reversal. The district court adequately addressed 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim(s) alleged in Ewell's petition by giving 
Ewell notice, generally, that he failed to support any of his allegations with 
admissible evidence and by finally dismissing the petition on that same basis 
after Ewell failed to respond. 
1 Ewell argues that the district court misperceived the allegations regarding trial 
counsel's alleged ineffectiveness in failing to "preserve the primary issue for 
appeal" as "a claim that his attorney should have generally challenged the use of 
prior allegations against him as a double jeopardy violation." (Appellant's brief, 
p.7 (citing R., p.135).) Ewell is incorrect. Ewell alleged in his affidavit that use of 
his prior convictions violated double jeopardy. (R., pp.75-76.) The district court 
treated these allegations as raising a substantive double jeopardy claim, not a 
claim that Ewell's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on double 
jeopardy grounds to the use of Ewell's prior convictions at sentencing. (See R., 
pp.117-18, 135 (addressing double jeopardy claim separate from claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel).) 
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Finally, even if the statements in Ewell's affidavit were sufficient to allege 
a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not renewing his motion to dismiss to 
challenge the use of his prior convictions for enhancement purposes, and even if 
the district court erred by failing to specifically address that claim, the error was 
harmless because the claim fails as matter of law and there is no additional 
evidence Ewell could have presented in support of his claim to establish he was 
entitled to relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. Ewell Should Be Precluded From Arguing For The First Time On Appeal 
That The District Court Failed To Address A "Claim" Never Alleged By 
Ewell In His Petition 
An application for post-conviction relief must "specifically set forth the 
grounds upon which the application is based, and clearly state the relief desired." 
I.C. § 19-4903; Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004); 
Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Pursuant to I.C. § 194908, "[a]II grounds for relief must be raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application." Monahan, 145 Idaho at 875, 187 P.3d 
at 1250 (citing I.C. § 19-4908) (emphasis added); Dunlap. 141 Idaho at 56, 106 
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P.3d at 382. A ground for relief known to the petitioner but not set forth in the 
original, supplemental or amended application is waived. I.C. § 19-4908. Lake 
v. State, 126 Idaho 333, 882 P.2d 988 (Ct App. 1994). 
Ewell's pro se post-conviction petition specifically set forth only four 
grounds for relief: 
(a) Violation of Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amend. Rights. 
(b) Guilty plea was neither knowingly nor intelligently given. 
(c) Psychosexual evaluation Marandaized [sic] PSI was not 
reviewed, nor rights given. Counsel admitted short-comings. 
(R., p.4 (capitalization altered).) Nowhere in his pro se petition did Ewell allege 
the claim he now asserts the district court failed to address - i.e., that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not renewing his motion to dismiss to argue that that 
the prior Washington convictions alleged in the amended information could not 
be used to justify the repeat sexual offender enhancement because none of the 
Washington offenses were substantially similar to any Idaho offense requiring 
sex offender registration. (See generally R., pp.3-7.) Nor did Ewell's post-
conviction counsel ever seek or obtain leave of the court to amend Ewell's 
petition to assert such a claim. Because Ewell did not specifically (or even 
generally) allege this claim in his post-conviction petition, the claim was waived 
and the district court necessarily did not err by failing to address it. I.C. § 19-
4908; see also Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523-24, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283-84 
(2010) ("It is clearly established under Idaho law that a cause of actions not 
raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment nor 
may it be considered for the first time on appeal.") (citations and internal 
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quotation marks omitted); Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110-11, 15 P.3d 820, 
823-24 (2000) (district court did not err in summarily dismissing post-conviction 
petition without considering claims neither alleged in the original petition, nor 
properly before the court in an amended petition filed without leave of the court). 
On appeal, even Ewell does not cite his post-conviction petition as the 
source of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not renewing his motion 
to dismiss, after the information was amended, to challenge the use of his prior 
Washington convictions to justify the repeat sexual offender enhancement. 
(See, generally, Appellant's brief.) He points instead to a few lines of text in the 
67-page affidavit he filed in support of his petition, where he asserted: 
The defendant was denied effective assistance again when 
his attorney failed to preserve the primary issue for appeal. 
Attorney Van Bishop "admitted his own incompetence" in a letter 
dated May 13, 2009, where he stated "I was ineffective in that I did 
not preserve the primary issue for appeal when I did not renew the 
motion to dismiss after the state amended the information 
(concerning the Prior Misd. Charge)[.] It is referred to in the States 
[sic] brief and the Courts [sic] decision." 
(R., p.74, cited in Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) The cited text occupies only eight 
lines of Ewell's 67-page affidavit, falls under the heading, "Stuart is 
Distinguishable From The Case At Bar, And Therefore, Should Not Apply" (R., 
p.73), and is sandwiched between Ewell's lengthy argument that he was entitled 
to have counsel present during his presentence interviews and evaluations (R., 
pp.13-73) and his arguments that trial counsel failed to perfect his appeal (R., 
p. 7 4) and that the use of his "past crimes" to enhance his sentence violated 
double jeopardy (R., pp.74-76). Contrary to Ewell's argument on appeal, 
however, there are at least two reasons why the inclusion of the above-cited text 
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in Ewell's affidavit was not sufficient to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim that Ewell now argues the district court failed to address. 
First, the "claim" was not specifically alleged in the petition as required by 
I.C. § 19-4908, but was instead contained in the affidavit Ewell filed in support of 
the claims in the petition. Although Ewell referred to the affidavit in his petition 
(see R., p.5), he did not include in the actual petition any specific claim that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a renewed motion to dismiss. (See 
generally R., pp.3-7.) Attaching a 67-page affidavit of facts and argument to a 
petition and requiring the district court to ferret out the "claims" therein does not 
meet the requirement of I. C. §§ 19-4903 and 19-4908 that all grounds for relief 
be specifically set forth in the petition itself. Because Ewell did not allege the 
"claim" in his petition, the district court was not required to address it. Cole, 135 
Idaho at 110-11, 15 P.3d at 823-24. 
Second, even if a post-conviction petitioner could state a claim for post-
conviction relief by alleging it only in an affidavit filed in support of his post-
conviction petition, there is no basis to believe that the above-cited portion of 
Ewell's affidavit actually raised the claim that Ewell now contends the district 
court should have addressed. The cited text states only that defense counsel 
'"admitted his own incompetence"' and was ineffective for failing "'to preserve the 
primary issue for appeal when [he] did not renew the motion to dismiss after the 
state amended the information (concerning the Prior Misd. Charge)."' (R., p.74.) 
On its face, this language does not assert a claim (deficient performance and 
prejudice), only an unsupported fact (defense counsel admitted he did not 
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preserve an issue for appeal). Nowhere in the cited text (or elsewhere in the 
affidavit) did Ewell allege the claim he now asserts on appeal - i.e., that his 
attorney should have field a renewed motion to dismiss to challenge "the 
applicability of the Washington offenses because they were not substantially 
similar to any Idaho offenses." (Appellant's brief, p.7 (citing R., p.74).) The cited 
text does state that counsel's alleged shortcomings (not preserving the primary 
issue for appeal and failing to renew a motion to dismiss) are '"referred to in the 
States [sic] brief and the Courts [sic] decision."' (R., p.74.) However, there is no 
context from which to glean to what brief and decision the affidavit was referring. 
It was Ewell's burden to "specifically set forth the grounds upon which" his 
post-conviction petition was based. I.C. § 19-4903; see also Monahan, 145 
Idaho at 877 n.2, 187 P.3d at 1252 n.2 ("[C]laims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel should be individually pied with specificity."). Having failed to specifically 
allege that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the motion to dismiss 
the repeat sexual offender enhancement on the basis that the prior Washington 
convictions alleged in the amended information were not substantially similar to 
any Idaho offenses requiring sex offender registration, Ewell cannot successfully 
claim on appeal that the allegations in his affidavit constituted a stand-alone 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim that the district court was required to 
consider before summarily dismissing his petition. 
12 
D. The District Court Adequately Addressed Ewell's Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel Claim(s) By Giving Ewell Notice That He Failed To Support Any 
Of His Allegations With Admissible Evidence And By Finally Dismissing 
The Petition On That Same Basis After Ewell Failed To Respond 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is 
entitled to relief. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 
(1983); Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 
1999). Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application 
for post-conviction relief when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine 
issue of material fact, which if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
applicant to the requested relief. Downing, 132 Idaho at 863,979 P.2d at 1221; 
Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), a district court may sua sponte dismiss a post-
conviction application when the court is satisfied that the applicant is not entitled 
to relief. Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 P.2d at 1221. In such instances, the 
court must give the petitioner notice of the reasons for its contemplated 
dismissal, and an opportunity, within 20 days, to respond. I.C. § 19-4906(b); 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995); 
Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 P .2d at 1221. The purpose of the 20-day notice 
requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to ensure that the applicant will have an 
opportunity to challenge an adverse decision before it becomes final. Baruth v. 
Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 158, 715 P.2d 369, 371 (Ct. App. 1986); Gibbs v. State, 
103 Idaho 758, 759, 653 P.2d 813, 814 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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Liberally construed, Ewell's post-conviction petition alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel, variously referred to by Ewell as: "Violation of ... Sixth ... 
Amend. Rights," "PSI was not reviewed, nor rights given," and "Counsel admitted 
short-comings." (R., p.4.) The facts and argument upon which Ewell based his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim(s) were set forth by Ewell in a 67-page 
affidavit filed in support of his petition. (R., pp.13-79.) Exercising its authority 
under I.C. § 19-4906(b), the district court gave Ewell notice of its intent to 
dismiss his petition in its entirety (R., pp.104-20), noting, generally, that Ewell 
failed to support any of his claims "with any other affidavits or evidence" and that 
"his factual allegations are not supported by the record" (R., p.104). The court 
specifically addressed the factual allegations underpinning the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims it deemed raised in Ewell's petition - i.e., that 
counsel was ineffective in relation to the presentence investigation and 
evaluation processes (see R., pp.115-17) - but it did not address the factual 
allegation in Ewell's affidavit that trial counsel failed to "preserve the primary 
issues for appeal when [he] did not renew the motion to dismiss after the state 
amended the information (concerning the Prior Misd. Charge)" (R., p.74). The 
court gave Ewell 20 days to respond to the proposed bases for dismissal of his 
petition. (R., pp.105, 119.) When Ewell failed to do so the district court entered 
an order finally dismissing the petition for the reasons articulated in its notice. 
(R., pp.121-37.) 
For the first time on appeal Ewell argues that the factual allegation in his 
affidavit regarding trial counsel's failure to renew his motion to dismiss was an 
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independent ineffective assistance of counsel claim that the trial court 
misperceived and/or failed to address. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) For the 
reasons set forth in Section C, supra, the factual allegation in Ewell's affidavit did 
not meet the requirements of a claim under the UPCPA because it was not 
specifically set forth in Ewell's post-conviction petition, see I.C. §§ 19-4903; 19-
4908, and did not otherwise have the attributes of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim because it failed to allege either deficient performance or 
prejudice, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Moreover, 
despite being given the opportunity to do so, Ewell never argued to the district 
court before it finally dismissed his petition that it had "misperceived" one of his 
claims. Having failed to do so, Ewell cannot complain for the first time on appeal 
that the court misperceived the allegations of his petition. See,~. Monahan v. 
State, 145 Idaho 872, 877, 187 P.3d 1247, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Sanchez 
v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991)) ("Generally, issues 
not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal."). 
The state acknowledges that a post-conviction petitioner need not 
respond to a district court's notice of intent to dismiss in order to preserve for 
appeal his claim that the petition was improperly dismissed. See Garza v. State, 
139 Idaho 533, 82 P .3d 445 (2003) (failure to respond to notice of intent to 
dismiss did not bar appeal of dismissal). However, where, as here, a 
represented petitioner receives notice of the bases for dismissal and fails to 
respond, he cannot later claim on appeal that petition was dismissed without 
adequate notice. DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601-02, 200 P.3d 1148, 
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1150-51 (2009). Ewell's claim on appeal is, in essence, just that - i.e., a claim 
that his petition was dismissed without notice of the basis for dismissal of the 
allegation in his affidavit regarding trial counsel's failure to renew the motion to 
dismiss. Ewell's appellate claim is without merit. 
There can be no question that the district court's order of conditional 
dismissal put Ewell on notice that it intended to dismiss his petition in its entirety, 
on the bases set forth in notice. The district court addressed Ewell's claims as it 
perceived them and set forth its rationale for dismissing those claims, including 
Ewell's failure to support any of his allegations with admissible evidence. (R., 
pp.104-20.) Although Ewell appears to argue otherwise, the district court was 
not required to address every factual allegation in Ewell's 67-page affidavit 
before finally dismissing the claims in his petition on the grounds set forth in its 
notice of intent to dismiss. If Ewell believed the court failed to recognize his 
factual allegations regarding trial counsel's alleged failure to "preserve the 
primary issue for appeal" as an independent ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, it was incumbent upon him to alert the court, after receiving notice of the 
proposed bases for dismissal, that the court had misperceived one of his claims. 
DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 602, 200 P.3d at 1151 (failure to complain about 
adequacy of notice of bases for proposed dismissal, before petition was finally 
dismissed, constituted a waiver of that issue on appeal); cf. Monahan, 145 Idaho 
at 876-77, 187 P.3d at 1251-52 (petitioner could not argue for the first time on 
appeal that trial court failed to rule on an unpled claim where claim was not tried 
with consent of the parties at the evidentiary hearing and petitioner failed to take 
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proper steps to receive a ruling from the district court on the unpled issue before 
the petition was dismissed). Because he failed to do so, Ewell has failed to show 
any basis for reversal. 
E. If The District Court Erred By Failing To Specifically Address The Factual 
Allegation In Ewell's Affidavit Regarding Trial Counsel's Failure To Renew 
The Motion To Dismiss, Such Error Is Harmless 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 provides for the summary disposition of an 
application for post-conviction relief upon motion by a party or on the court's own 
initiative. Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 899, 908 P.2d 590, 592 (Ct. App. 
1995). "When the court considering the petition for post-conviction relief is 
contemplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties of its intention to 
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissal." Banks v. State, 
123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993) (citations omitted). The purpose of 
the notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to give the petitioner the 
opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence to establish a genuine 
issue of material fact. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073, 
1074 (1991 ); State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 489, 632 P.2d 676, 678 
(1981); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818, 892 P.2d 488, 493 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
The district court dismissed Ewell's post-conviction petition without 
specifically addressing the allegation contained in Ewell's affidavit that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a renewed motion to dismiss after the 
information was amended. Any error in the dismissal of this allegation without 
notice is harmless, however, because Ewell's claim ultimately fails as a matter of 
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law, and no legal authority or evidence Ewell could have presented would have 
overcome summary dismissal of his claim. See I.R.C.P. 61. ("The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding 
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties."); Gomez v. State, 120 
Idaho 632, 634, 818 P .2d 336 (Ct. App. 1991) (applying harmless error analysis 
in post-conviction case). 
The amended information alleged that Ewell was subject to the repeat 
sexual offender enhancement of I.C. § 19-2520G because he had previously 
pied guilty in the State of Washington to the following felonies: (1) Luring A 
Person With A Sexual Motivation, RCW 9A.40.090 and RCW 9.94A.030(38); (2) 
Communication With A Minor For Immoral Purposes, RCW 9.58A.090; and (3) 
Luring, RCW 9A.40.090. (#35093 R., p.64.2) As framed by Ewell on appeal, the 
crux of the allegation in his affidavit filed in support of his post-conviction petition 
was that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew his motion to dismiss the 
repeat sexual offender enhancement, after the information was amended, "so 
that he could assert that the Washington offenses were not substantially similar 
to Idaho offenses." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) To succeed on this claim, Ewell was 
required to demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Ewell did not even 
2 The district court took judicial notice of the record and transcripts in Ewell's 
underlying criminal case. (R., pp.105, 122.) Contemporaneously with the filing 
of this brief, the state is filing a motion requesting the Idaho Supreme Court to do 
the same. 
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allege deficient performance or prejudice in his affidavit, nor could he have 
presented any additional evidence or legal authority to establish an issue of 
material fact with respect to this claim because, even if made, a renewed motion 
to dismiss the repeat sexual offender enhancement on the basis that the 
Washington offenses were not substantially similar to any Idaho offenses 
requiring sex offender registration would have failed as a matter of law. See 
Wolf v. State,_ P.3d _, 2011 WL 1900460 *3 (Ct. App. 2011) (rev. denied 
8/16/11) (citing Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. 
App.1996)) ("Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a 
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial 
court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test."). 
As noted by the Court of Appeals in Ewell's direct appeal from his 
judgment, I.C. § 19-2520G "mandates a fifteen-year minimum term of 
confinement for a crime requiring registration as a sex offender under I.C. § 18-
8304 if the individual was previously convicted of such an offense in Idaho or of 
a substantially equivalent offense in another state."3 State v. Ewell, 147 Idaho 
3 The relevant portion of the statute provides: 
Any person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty to any 
offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 
18-8304, Idaho Code, . . . shall be sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum term of confinement to the custody of the state board of 
correction for a period of not less than fifteen (15) years, if it is 
found by the trier of fact that previous to the commission of such 
crime the defendant has been found guilty of or has pleaded guilty 
to a violation of any crime or an offense committed in this state or 
another state which, if committed in this state, would require the 
person to register as a sexual offender as set forth in section 18-
8304, Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 19-2520G(2). 
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31, 33, 205 P.3d 680, 682 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). Whether a 
criminal offense in another state is substantially equivalent to an Idaho offense is 
a question of law that requires comparison of the relevant statues. See State v. 
Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 803-05, 172 P.3d 555, 558-60 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(comparing Montana DUI statute with Idaho DUI statute to determine whether 
defendant's prior Montana DUI conviction qualified for purposes of enhancement 
as "substantially conforming" to the provisions of LC. § 18-8004). Exact 
correspondence between the foreign statute(s) and the Idaho statute(s) at issue 
is not required. l.!t. 
In the underlying criminal case, the district analyzed the applicable 
statutes, applied the correct legal standards and correctly determined in a well-
researched and reasoned opinion that the Washington offenses of luring, RCW 
9A.40.090, and luring with sexual motivation, RCW 9A.40.090 and RCW 
9.94A.030(38), are crimes which, if committed in Idaho, would require sex 
offender registration and, as such, trigger the mandatory minimum sentence 
requirement of I.C. § 19-2520G(2). The state adopts as its argument on appeal 
the district court's analysis, as set forth at pages two (2) through five (5) of the 
court's Order Denying Motions To Dismiss Count VII. (#35093 R., pp.70-73.) 
The order is attached as Appendix A to this brief and is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
Like luring and luring with sexual motivation, the Washington offense of 
communication with a minor for immoral purposes, RCW 9.58A.090, of which the 
amended information alleged Ewell was convicted in 2002 (#35093 R., p.64), is 
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also a crime that, if committed in Idaho, would require sex offender registration. 
Under RCW 9.68A.090, any person "who communicates with a minor for 
immoral purposes" is guilty of a crime. For purposes of that statute, a minor is 
"any person under eighteen years of age." RCW 9.68A.011 (5). The term 
"immoral purposes" is not specifically defined by statute. However, to avoid 
overbreadth and vagueness concerns, the Supreme Court of Washington has 
interpreted RCW 9.68A.090 to prohibit "communication with children for the 
predatory purpose of promoting their exposure to and involvement in sexual 
misconduct." State v. McNallie, 846 P.2d 1358, 1363-64 (Wash. 1993). So 
limited, the Washington offense of communication with a minor for immoral 
purposes is substantially similar to Idaho offenses that prohibit the solicitation 
and/or attempted solicitation of a minor child to participate in a sexual act, 
including, but not limited to, attempted lewd conduct, I.C. § 18-1508, attempted 
sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age, I.C. § 18-
1508A, and attempted enticing of children over the internet, I.C. § 18-1509A- all 
of which require sex offender registration pursuant to I.C. § 18-8304. Because 
the Washington offense of communication with a minor for immoral purposes is 
an offense that, if committed in Idaho, would have required sex offender 
registration, the state properly relied on that offense as a basis for the repeat 
sexual offender enhancement alleged in the amended information. 
Even if Ewell's trial counsel would have filed a renewed motion to dismiss 
the repeat sexual offender enhancement on the basis that the Washington 
offenses alleged in the amended information were not substantially similar to any 
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Idaho offenses requiring sex offender registration, such motion would not have 
succeeded. The state needed only to prove that Ewell had been previously 
convicted of one prior offense that, if committed in Idaho, would have required 
sex offender registration. I.C. § 19-2520G. Because, as set forth above, all 
three Washington offenses alleged in the amended information qualified as 
offenses that would require sex offender registration in Idaho, any renewed 
motion to dismiss the repeat sexual offender enhancement would have failed as 
a matter of law. Accordingly, even if the district court erred in dismissing Ewell's 
petition without specifically addressing the claim regarding trial counsel's failure 
to file a renewed motion to dismiss, such error was harmless because there is 
nothing Ewell could present to overcome summary dismissal of this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Ewell's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 5th day of December 2011. 
RI A. FLEMIN 
Deputy Attorney Generar-----
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERlC HOW ARD EWELL 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. H0700608 
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS COUNT VII 
On June 11, 2007, Eric Howard Ewell moved to dismiss Count Vll of the lnformation on 
the basis that a conviction for Luring in Washington was insufficient to invoke sex offender 
registration in Idaho, making I.C. § l 9~2520G prescribing mandatory minimum sentencing 
inapplicable. The Court heard argument on August 1, 2007, and orally denied the Motion, This 
memorandum constitutes the Court's conclusions of law. 
On September 13, 2007, Ewell again moved to dismiss Count VII, contending that tho 
statute is unconstitutionally vague in that the penalty is ambiguous. The State failed to file any 
19 response. 
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For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Ewell's Motions. 
BACKGROUND 
On May 8, 2007, the State charged Eric Harold Ewell by Information with Counts I-VI, 
Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material, Felony, I.C. § 18-1507A and Count VII, Sexual 
Offender Enhancement, Felony, I.C. § 19-25200. The Sexual Offender Enhancement charge was 
based on Ewell's Washington 2002 conviction for Luring with a finding of Sexual Motivation in 
violation of Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.40.090 and 9.94A.835. Ewell was, in fact, required to 
register as a sex offender in Washington state because of his conviction for this crime. 
On June 11, 2007, Ewell moved to dismiss Count VII of the Infonnation on the basis that 
a conviction for Luring with a finding of Sexual Motivation in Washington was insufficient to 
31 ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO DISMISS COUNT VII 
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invoke sex offender registration in Idaho. making LC. § 19-25200 inapplicable to him as a matter 
2 of law, The Court denied his Motion orally. 
3 September 13, 2007 t Ewell renewed his Motion, arguing l.C. § 19-25200 was 
4 unconstitutionally vague. The Court disagrees,-
5 ANALYSIS 
6 I. LC. § 19-2520G APPLIES TO EWELL. 
7 The State charged Ewell under I.C. § 19-25200, the sexual offender enhancement statute, 
8 
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in addition to six counts of Possession of Sexually Exp~oitative Material. Ewell contends this 
enhancement statute does not apply to him because his Washington crime would not have 
requir~d sex offender registration in Idaho. I.C. § 19-25200 provides in relevant part as follows: 
(2) Any person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty to any offense requiring sex 
offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, . . . shall be 
sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of confinement to the custody oft.he state 
board of correction for a period of not less than fifteen (1 S) years, if it is found by 
the trier of fact that previous to the commission of such crime the defendant has 
been found guilty of or has pleaded guilty to a violation of any crime or an offense 
committed in this state or another state which, if committed in this state, would 
require the person to register as a sexual offender as set forth in section 18-8304, 
Idaho Code. 
Ewell contends the crime of Luring with a finding of Sexual Motivation would not require him to 
register in Idaho if convicted in Idaho. Therefore, the Court examined the Washington code to 
determine what this crime entails. 
The Revised Code of Washington (R.C.W.) for the crime of Luring reads in relevant part 
as follows: 
A person commits the crime oflurlng if the person: 
(1) (a) Orders, lures, or attempts to lure a minor ... into any area or structure 
that is obscured from or inaccessible to the public or into a motor vehicle; 
(b) Does not have the consent of the minor's parent or guardian ... ; and 
( c) Is unknown to the child .... 
"'"'* ( 4) Luring is a class C felony .1 
1 Clas.s C felonies are punishable by up to five years in state prison, or by a fine of ten thousand dollars, or both in 
Washington. R.C.W. 9A.20.02 l. 
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1 R.C.W. 9A.40.090. Ewell was convicted of Luring with a finding of Sexual Motivation.2 In 
2 Washington, the state prosecutor may attach a special allegation of sexual motivation to a charge 
3 when a reasonable and objective fact finder could find a sexual motivation for the crime. R.C.W. 
4 9.94A.835.3 Under Washington law, sexual motivation Hmeans that one of the purposes for 
S which the defendant committed the crime was for the purpose of his or her sexual gratification." 
6 R.C.W. 9.94A.030(43). At trial, the state must prove the allegation of sexual motivation beyond a 
7 reasonable doubt. R,C.W. 9.94A.835(2). A conviction with a special allegation of sexual 
8 motivation requires the person to register as a sex offender under the Washington Sex Off ender 
9 Registration statute. See R.C.W. 9A.44.130(l)(a), R.C.W. 9.94A.030, Therefore, Ewell was 
10 required to register as a sex offender in Washington. 
11 However, in order for Luring with a Sexual Motivation to function as a predicate to the 
12 mandatory minimums found in I.C. § 19-25200, it must also be an offense that if committed in 
13 Idaho would require the person to register as a sexual offender under l.C. § 18-8304. See 
14 LC.§ 19-25200(2). The State contends that the Washington crime of Luring would constitute the 
15 Idaho crime of Second Degree Kidnapping, Felony, LC. § 18-4503, where the victim is an 
16 unrelated minor. The Court agrees. The Court also finds that Ewell could potentially have been 
17 convicted of First Degree Kidnapping in Idaho under the same elements for conviction of Luring 
18 with a Sexual Motivation. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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2 Ewell was also convicted of Communication with a Minor for Immoral Purposes, felony (R.C.W. 9.68-A.O90), a sex 
crime and Luring, felony, R.C.W. 9A.4O.O9O. 
3 R.C.W. 9.94A.835. Special allegation--Sexual motivation-Procedures 
(l) TM prosecuting attorney shall file a special allegation of sexual motivation In every criminal Clise, 
felony, gross misdemeMot, or misdemeanor, other than sex offenses as defined in RCW 9.94A.030(38)(a) or (c) 
when sufficient admissible evidence exists, which, when considered with the most plausible, reasonably foreseeable 
defense that could be raised under the evidence, would Justify a finding of sexual motivation by a reasonable and 
objective fact-fmder. 
(2) ln a criminal c11se wherein there has been II special allegation the .state shall prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accused committed the crime with a sexual motivation. The court shall make a findlng of fact of 
whether or not a seicual motivation was present at the time of the commission of the crime, or If a jury trial ls had, the 
1 jury shall, if it finds the defendant guilty, also find a special verdict as to whether or not the defendant committed the 
29 crlme with a sexual motivation. This finding shall not be applied to sex offenses as defined in RCW 9.94A.030(38)(a) 
or (c). 
27 
28 
30 
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Second Degree Kidnapping (LC. §§ 18-4501, -4503) where the victim is an unrelated 
minor child triggers Idaho's sexual offender registration statute. I.C. § l 8-8304(a).4 
LC.§ 18~4501 establishes the elements of Kidnapping and describes them as follows: 
Every person who wilfully: "Leads, takes, entices away or detains a child under the 
age of sixteen (16) years, with intent to keep or conceal it from its custodial parent, 
guardian ... ;" 
6 Where the leading, taking, enticing away or detaining of an unrelated minor child is not for the 
7 purpose of raping or committing any lewd and lascivious act for the defendant's sexual 
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gratification, it is Kidnapping in the Second Degree. Conviction for Kidnapping in the Second 
Degree requires a person to register regardless of whether the defendant enticed _the child for 
sexual purposes. I.C. § 18-8304(a). Where the kidnapping is for the purpose of committing a 
lewd act or rape, it is Kidnapping in the First Degree, and the defendant is likewise required to 
register. Id. 
Comparing both the Washington crime and Second Degree Kidnapping, itis clear that if 
Ewell had committed the same acts in Idaho that made him guilty of Luring with a Sexual 
Motivation in Washington, he would have committed Second Degree Kidnapping where the 
victim was an unrelated child, triggering Idaho's sex offender registration. Leading, taking, 
enticing or detaining is clearly substantially equivalent to ''ordering, luring, or attempt to lure." In 
fact, the use of word ulure" in Washington's Luring A Child statute is intended to prohibit a 
defined class of persons from enticing or attempting to entice a child into specific place. State v. 
Dana, 926 P.2d 344 reconsideration denied, review denied, 948 P.2d 389 (Wash.1996). 
Moreover, both statutes require the victim be a child. The Washington crime of Luring 
also requires the victim be unknown to the defendant. This is substantially equivalent to Idaho's 
requirement that the victim and defendant' be unrelated. The Court finds this element to 
substantially equivalent. 
Furthe1more, although expressed differently, clearly Washington's requirement that the 
child be lured into an obscured or inaccessible area is substantially equivalent to Idaho's enticing 
29 4 The Idaho registration requirement applies to any person who on or after July I, 1993, is convicted "of the crime, or 
an attempt, a solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for In .. , section 18-4503 (second degree 
3 O kidnapping where the victim is an unrelated minor chlld .. ," LC § 18-8304( I )(a). · 
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the child away with intent to keep or conceal the child from the custodial parent The intent to 
conceal the child from the child's parent or guardian is implicit in the Luring statute. 
Luring with a finding of Sexual Motivation also meets the elements of First Degree 
Kidnapping. First Degree Kidnapping is identical to Second Degree Kidnapping with the added 
requirement that the kidnapping be committed for the purpose of committing a lewd and 
IA 
lascivious act upon a child under the age of sixteen with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or 
gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of any person, LC. 18-4502. Washington's special 
finding of sexual motivation clearly satisfies the intent requirement for First Degree Kidnapping. 
Therefore, the Court fmds that Luring with a finding of Sexual Motivation is subst.antially 
equivalent to Second Deg~ Kidnapping of an unrelated child and First Degree Kidnapping, both 
of which require registration.5 Thus, Ewell's prior conviction in Washington satisfies the 
enhancement requirement found in I.C. § 19-25200. 
II. I.C. § 19-2520G IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Ewell contends this statute is unconstitutionally vague and, therefore. asks the Court to 
dismiss Count VII. The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Casano, 140 [daho 461. 464~ 95 P.3d 79, 82 (Ct. App. 
2004). This doctrine requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient 
clarity and definiteness to permit ordinary people to imderstand what conduct is prohibited and to 
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id. An enactment is void for vagueness if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Id, Due process requires that defendants be infonned as to 
what the state commands or forbids and that persons of common intelligence not be forced to 
guess at the meaning of the 0riminal law, State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 
(2003); State v, Cobb, 132 ldaho 195,969 P.2d 244 (1998), citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 
574 (1974). 
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rocliford, 408 U.S. 104 (l 972). 
Furthennore, as a matter of due process, no one may be required at the peril of loss of liberty to 
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 847 n. 4 (91h 
s The fact that an included offense would include I.C. § 18-1509, Enticing Children, does not change the analysis, 
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1 Cir.1986), citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939), Smith v. United States, cert. 
2 denied,481 U.S.1032(1987). 
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A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a 
defendant's conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. For a "facial vagueness" 
challenge to be successful, "the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly 
vague in all of its applications." Id quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982). In other words, the challenger must show that the 
enactment is invalid in toto. 
To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge~ a complainant must show that the 
statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct1 failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's 
conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had 
unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest him. A "facial vagueness" analysis is 
mutually exclusive from an "as applied" analysis. See Schwartzmtller, supra at 1346. 
A statute should not be held void for vagueness if it can be given any practical 
interpretation. State v, Hart, 135 ldaho 827, 25 P.3d 850 (2001). 
Ewell challenges this statute both as applied and facialty. 
A. Ewell's facial challenge fails. 
Ewell complains about the potential sanctions and claims they are unclear. The Court 
disagrees. The analysis begins with the statutory language itself. Ewell was charged separately in 
the Information under LC. § 19-25200 which states, in relevant part, as follows: 
**** 
(2) Any person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty to any offense 
requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 18~8304, Idaho Code, ... , 
shall be sentenced to a mandatorr minimum term of confinement to the custody of 
the state board of: cim:egtion foi: a period of not less tpan fi;flften (15) year§, if it is 
found by the trier of fact that previous to the commission of such crime the 
defendant has been found guiity of or has pleaded guilty to a violation of any crime 
or an offense committed in this state or another state which, if committed in this 
state, would require the person to register as a sexual offender as set forth in 
section 18~8304, Idaho Code. 
***"' (4) The mandatory minimum term provided in this section shall be imposed 
where the aggravating factor is separately charged in the information or indictment 
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and admitted by the accused or found to be true by the trier of fact at a trial of the 
substantive crime. A court shall not have the power to suspend, withhold, retain 
jurisdiction, or commute a mandatory minimum sentence imposed pursuant to this 
section. Any sentence im12osed under the provisions of this section shall run 
consecutivs to any other sentence imposed by the court 
(Emphasis added.) The Court finds this statute is clear and unambiguous. 
If a person bas been previously convicted of a crime requiring sex offender registration 
and either a jury finds the person guilty or the person pleads guilty of a new offense which would 
also require registration grui that person is charged separately in the Information or Indictment 
under this statute, the court must impose a mandatory fifteen year sentence consecutive to any 
other sentence the court imposes in that case. Th.ere is nothing about the statute that is unclear or 
unconstitutional. 
Therefore, Ewell, who was charged separately in the Information, faces a sentence of 
fifteen ( 15) years conse.s;:utive to any sentence the Court imposes for the underlying charges of six 
counts of Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material. Each count carries a potential ten (10) 
year sentence. If the Court were to run each count consecutively, Ewell faces a potential sentence 
of seventy-five (75) years with fifteen (15) years fixed.6 
B. Ewell's as applied challenge fails. 
Likewise, Ewell's challenge to the statute as applied fails. Ewell contends this statute 
does not apply to him because the maximum sentence applicable to Possession of Sexually 
Exploitative Material is· only ten years. Therefore, he argues this statute limits the Court's 
discretion and forces the Court to "guess" what the sentence could be under the statute as applied 
to a crime for which the maximum sentence is less. The Court disagrees. 
6 The fifteen year fixed sentence is served first. According to LC. § 19-2513, 
lf,t~e offense carries a ma,ndatory mlnimum penalty as provided by statute, the court shall spe(:ify 11 
minimum period of confinement consistent with such statute. If the offense is subject to an 
enhanced penalty as provided by statute, or if consecutive sentences are imposed for multiple 
offenses, the court shall, If required by statute, direct that the enhancement or each consecutive 
sentence contaJn a minimum period of confinement; 111 such even~ all minimum terms of 
confinement shall be served before any indeterminate periods commence to run. 
(Emphasis added,) 
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1 This is precisely the kind of crime this statute was amended to enhance. The purpose was 
2 to increase the potential penalty and to limit the Court's ability to suspend that sentence. There is 
3 nothing inherently wrong about that. 
4 Furthennore, the Supreme Court has already ruled that a statute providing additional 
5 • mandatory sentences for certain behaviors, like enhancement for use of a firearm (I.C. § 19-2520), 
6 was not invalid for violating doctrine of separation of powers, even prior to amendment to 
7 Constitution authorizing legislature to prescribe minimum sentences for crimes committed with 
8 firearms. Const. Art. 1, § 11; see State v. Grob, 107 Idaho 496, 690 P .2d 951 (1984). 
9 Therefore, the Court denies the Motions to Dismiss. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 2fd day of October 2007. 
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